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ABSTRACT  
This  paper  presents  a  reflection  attempting  to  situate  the  concepts  of  justice  and 
argumentation in Perelman’s approach in dialogue with the Bakhtin Circle’s theories. 
For  this  purpose,  it  analyses  the  concept  of  justice,  deals  with  the  concept  of 
argumentation in order to situate its field and to emphasize how it supports the concept 
of  justice,  highlights  the  ethical  and  dialogical  aspects  of  legal  argumentation, 
establishing connections between Perelman’s ideas and dialogic principles of language, 
and,  finally,  attempts  to  show  how  different  voices  intersect  in  the  argumentative 
confrontation through the analysis of two excerpts of legal discourses.  
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RESUMO 
Este trabalho apresenta uma reflexão procurando situar os conceitos de justiça e de 
argumentação na abordagem de Perelman em diálogo com as teorias do Círculo de 
Bakhtin. Para tanto, aborda o conceito de justiça; trata do conceito de argumentação 
procurando situar o seu campo e destacar como esse conceito respalda o de justiça; 
destaca o caráter ético e dialógico da argumentação jurídica estabelecendo conexões 
entre as ideias de Perelman e os princípios dialógicos da linguagem; e, finalmente, 
procura mostrar como diferentes vozes se interseccionam no embate argumentativo por 
meio da análise de dois fragmentos de discurso jurídico. 
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Introduction 
 
Chaïm Perelman, as Lempereuer (2005) emphasizes, is considered one of the 
greatest Law philosophers of the 20th century. His relevance, however, goes beyond 
Law; he  plays  a  prominent role in  language studies, particularly in  those related to 
argumentation. Considering that the legal practice is based on the adversary principle, 
which joins two parties in lawsuits, Perelman attributed a main role to argumentation. 
His studies led to an intensification of Rhetoric, since he resumed the legal genre of Old 
Rhetoric and enriched it.  
Matters such as justice, values, reasonableness, and argumentative procedures 
are  frequent  in  Perelman’s  works.  When  thinking  of  them  jointly,  we  raise  some 
questions about the concept of justice, the field of argumentation, and the relationships 
between argumentation and the concept of justice. These questions seem to dialogue 
with studies on discourse, allowing us to broaden our vision and to search for new 
relationships between different theoretical points of view about the same object. In this 
way, the paper intends to reflect upon the underlying dialogic vision in the concept of 
justice proposed by Perelman, which is present in legal discourse. Thus, the present text 
is divided into three parts, besides this introduction and the final considerations: The 
first one broaches the concept of justice for Perelman; the second part deals with the 
concept  of  argumentation, attempting to  situate  its  field  and to  emphasize how this 
concept supports that of justice; and the third part attempts to show the ethical and 
dialogic aspects of legal argumentation according to Perelman’s approach.  
 
1 The Concept (s) of Justice for Perelman 
 
Perelman (1980) introduces his thinking about the conceptualization of justice, 
warning his readers that he does not intend to present just one concept; he emphasizes 
that his intentions differ from those of most people. He does not believe in the existence 
of only one meaning which may grasp this idea. For him, the idea of justice, as well as 
the idea of other abstract nouns such as freedom, good, virtue, is based on a scale of 
values built  by individuals  during their  existence in  order to  guide them. Thus, for Bakhtiniana, São Paulo, 9 (1): 19-35, Jan./Jul. 2014.  21 
 
Perelman, justice is just a virtue among others; and from another perspective, it involves 
morality through which he counterbalances other values connected to it.  
The philosopher reminds us that all revolutions and wars were always in the 
name of justice, to which as many supporters of the new order as the defenders of the 
old one are attached; however, each one is convinced that their positioning is fair. As a 
result, every one speaks about a different justice, which shows that there is not a true, 
absolute concept of justice, but only concepts acceptable to a specific community in a 
certain situation. According to Perelman (1980, p.2), “Each will defend a conception of 
justice that puts him in the right and his opponent in the wrong.” 
Starting, therefore, from the thinking that justice depends on the values of each 
one,  he  presents  various  conceptions  of  justice  which  emphasize  how  they  can  be 
understood on the basis of different values, numbered here from one to six to help our 
reading.  According  to  the  philosopher,  the  main  conceptions  of  justice  are  the 
following: 1. “To each the same thing.” This conception declares that “all the people 
taken into account must be treated in the same way, without regard to any of their 
distinguishing particularities” (PERELMAN, 1980, p.2). According to this conception, 
there is not a perfect justice because “the perfectly just being is death” (PERELMAN, 
1980, p.3). 2. “To each according to his merits” (PERELMAN, 1980, p.3). The ideia 
here is that human beings should receive proportionate consideration according to their 
merits. 3. “To each according to his works” (PERELMAN, 1980, p.3). This ideia of 
justice does not presuppose equal treatment for all, but one according to the results of 
their actions. It has, therefore, a practical aspect because it fails to take the intention and 
the sacrifice into account to the detriment of the results. 4. “To each according to his 
needs” (PERELMAN, 1980, p.4). This is not about considering the merit, but about 
meeting the basic needs of man, which makes this justice formula similar to charity. 5. 
“To  each  according  to  his  ranks”  (PERELMAN,  1980,  p.4-5).  It  recognizes  the 
differences men acquire according to their position, but the intrinsic qualities of the 
person are not considered. According to Vannier (2001), this rule of justice is aimed to 
hierarchical  societies  like  lineage  societies.  6.  “To  each  according  to  his  legal 
entitlement”  (PERELMAN,  1980,  p.5).  For  Perelman  (1980),  this  formula  is  a 
paraphrase of the Roman suum cuique tribuere, and it means that the fair live according 
to the letter of the law. The reading of justice formulas proposed by Perelman indicates 22  Bakhtiniana, São Paulo, 9 (1): 19-35, Jan./Jul. 2014. 
 
how the concept is unsteady. Legal discourse is supported, to justify its decisions, as 
much  in  equality  as  in  difference,  through  conflicting  formulas  which  demand, 
therefore, multiple perspectives of interpretation according to the values of those who 
apply them.  
In fact, the choice of a normative system admits a more general value whereby 
rules are deduced. For Perelman (1980), this is about a value based on affection which 
is  based  neither  on  logic  nor  on  reality.  Such  value  is  arbitrary,  irrational,  and  is 
founded upon the emotional character of essential values in every normative system.  
It is from this notion of values that Perelman (1980) seems to situate the judge in 
his decidable role. For Perelman (1999), in Logique juridique: Nouvelle rhétorique, the 
judge’s role is beyond the simple enforcement of the letter of the law, which, as such, 
would be understood as unfair. This means that when a letter of the law brings  an 
ethical problem to a given case, it is necessary to come back to the legislator’s intention; 
it gives the judge an opportunity to interpret the texts and to pass sentences which seem 
fairer. The sense that allows declaring some acts fair and others unfair is, according to 
Perelman, ethics. 
The  philosopher  argues  that  the  notion  of  justice  pre-exists  its  linguistic 
expression because it corresponds to a universal sense. And even though the idea of 
justice applies in relation to real facts in many different ways, it involves something 
universal, the notion of equality: “We can, then, define formal or abstract justice as a 
principle of  action in  accordance with which beings  of  one and the same essential 
category must  be treated in  the same way”  (PERELMAN,  1980, p.11;  emphasis  in 
original).  What  occurs,  however,  is  that,  in  relation  to  their  values,  each  one  has 
different ideas of what kind of application the rule of justice must have. It is necessary 
to consider, however, that there are notions of ethics, although vague, which, taken to a 
certain degree of abstraction, may be considered universal. In general, it is in the name 
of these notions that judges allow themselves to interpret the spirit of the law, instead of 
applying it ipsis litteris.  
The  rule  of  justice  also  includes  another  conception  postulated  by  Perelman 
(2012): Acceptability. For Perelman, the fair action  
 
is in accordance with an accepted rule or, at least, with an established 
precedent. When an authorized decision broached, in a certain way, a Bakhtiniana, São Paulo, 9 (1): 19-35, Jan./Jul. 2014.  23 
 
relevant case of a certain category, it is very fair and rational to broach 
a case essentially similar in the same way (2012, p.119).
1 
 
Thus  the  application  of  justice  supposes  a  classification  of  human  beings 
according to their essential characteristics.  
The  fact  is  that,  for  Perelman  (2012,  p.58),  our  sense  of  justice  considers, 
simultaneously, several essential categories, which are not always in agreement. This 
makes  the  work  complex  and  allows  us  to  conclude,  with  the  author,  that  “perfect 
justice is not of this world.”
2 It is always possible to say that something was unfair 
because it didn’t take into account a  criterion  considered essential by the interested 
person. We can affirm, from Perelman’s thinking, that the notion of justice is fluid and 
not based on facts, but on values applied in the assessment of the facts, which implies 
different points of view, controversies, disagreement, and agreement as well.  
 
2 Rhetoric, Justice, Legal Argumentation, and the Question of Values 
 
The relationships between Rhetoric and justice are present since the origins of 
Rhetoric. Studies on Classical Rhetoric report (cf. ROBRIEUX, 1993) that it emerged 
from proceedings to recover lands which had been expropriated by tyrants who invaded 
Sicily, in  Italy, at the beginning of the 5th century B.C. The invaders deported the 
island’s  inhabitants  to  settle  their  mercenaries  there.  But  a  democratic  movement 
reverted the situation, and it was necessary to repare the damages left, which occurred 
by  means  of  proceedings  conducted  for  the  first  time  in  front  of  a  popular  jury. 
According  to  Robrieux  (1993),  it  was  from  the  necessity  of  convincing  this  jury’s 
members that Rhetoric came from, which connects it, since its origins, to jurisdictional 
acts.  
It’s  worth  considering  that  speaking  well  or  poorly  implies  intention  and, 
therefore, argumentation. We argue for a determined purpose, which, as Danblon (2005) 
emphasizes, can be making decisions to change a world representation. In addition, we 
                                                 
1 Text in original: est celle qui se conforme à une règle admise ou, du moins à un précédent établi. Quand 
une d￩cision autoris￩e a trait￩ d’une certaine fa￧on un cas relevant d’une certaine cat￩gorie, il est bien 
juste, et rationnel, de traiter de la même façon un cas essentiellement semblable. (PERELMAN, 2012, 
p.119). 
2 Text in original: la justice parfaite n’est pas de ce monde. 24  Bakhtiniana, São Paulo, 9 (1): 19-35, Jan./Jul. 2014. 
 
concur with the author that we only build argumentations in domains where men exert 
some kind of control. The legal sphere is one of them, and Rhetoric’s own history 
testifies it.  
In  legal  practices,  argumentation  occupies  a  prominent  place,  playing  an 
important  role  due  to  the  necessity  of  convincing  and  to  constant  decision-making  
involved in the work of lawyers, judges, and jurists. Indeed, as Perelman (1999) teaches 
us, Law is elaborated through controversies as well as through argumentation, showing 
that arguments used by opponents are irrelevant, arbitrary, inopportune, invalid, and that 
the solution proposed by them is unfair.  
In the same sense, Danblon (2005) postulates that arguing consists in expressing 
reasoning to lead an audience to adopt a conclusion which it does not adhere to. As this 
scholar explains, it is a complex action that pressuposes, at least, the domain of three 
quite elaborated concepts: Reasoning, audience, and conclusion. When we argue, we 
determine  a  relationship  between  reasoning  and  conclusion,  establishing  a  pertinent 
connection  between  both.  This  pertinent  connection  is  based  on  a  series  of  world 
representations, which are shared by the arguing community; they are representations 
which  sometimes  can  be  expressed  under  the  form  of  laws,  general  principles,  or 
proverbial  thruths.  It  is  what  the  rhetorical  tradition  has  called  commonplace.  The 
pertinent  bond  between  reasoning  and  conclusion  is  valuable  to  the  audience  we 
address.  
As  with  justice,  Rhetoric  is  based  on  values  accepted  by  the  community. 
According to Perelman (2012), the rhetorical action in justice consists of searching for 
conditions  which  allow  us  to  qualify  an  act,  a  rule  or  a  person  as  fair;  it  means, 
therefore, to determine what is valid, what deserves to be approved in the area of social 
action. From this point of view, justice also resorts to commonplaces or to values that 
represent the aspirations of the community where it is inserted and whom it serves.  
As Perelman defines, argumentation consists of a set of discursive techniques for 
“obtaining or reforcing the adherence of the audience to some thesis, assent to which is 
hoped for” (1979, p.10). This definition includes the concept of agreement, which has 
nothing  to  do  with  truth,  but  is  connected  to  adhesion  and,  for  this  reason, 
argumentation never develops in the emptiness. Arguing, as we emphasized before, has 
to do with decision-making, whether to choose a vacation destination or to sentence or Bakhtiniana, São Paulo, 9 (1): 19-35, Jan./Jul. 2014.  25 
 
not a defendant. It is decision-making from discourse, whether your own discourse or 
other people’s, that is, those supposed to be convinced. Rhetoric is, therefore, connected 
with discourse, with the use of words. From this point of view, threat and promise are 
part of the field of argumentation because they use language to get adhesion. That is 
why Perelman (2012) excludes violence and caress, once both are not necessarily based 
on speech. In addition, according to his examples, the demonstration, which works with 
the truth of premises that support the truth of a conclusion, is not part of the rhetorical 
field.  
Argumentation, in contrast, is based on valid premises, that is, acceptable as true 
in a given context for a certain community, but not absolutely true. So the adhesion to a 
thesis is not connected to the notion of truth, but it depends on values. Values, in their 
turn, are not absolute, and they vary. Argumentation is structured on the basis of the 
values of the speaker and of the audience, in constant dialogue. This is the first concept 
of argumentation which supports the justice argumentation: The concept of value, that 
is, a system of beliefs and certainties accepted as true for a certain social community. As 
Van Dijk (1998) observes, they are the pillars of the moral order of societies, since basic 
social opinions are built starting from these values. 
For  Perelman  (1999),  in  the  act  of  decision-making  there  is  the  intersection 
between  justice  and  argumentation.  Argumentation  is  based  on  uncertainties,  which 
appeals to human freedom and, from this point of view, the notions of moral issues and 
freedom  are  intrinsic  to  argumentation,  since  no  argumentation  is  based  on  truth 
because  adhesion  vanishes  before  truth.  Indeed,  according  to  Perelman,  there  is  no 
freedom  in  truth  because  it  demands  the  submission  of  ignorance  to  knowledge. 
Freedom is formed, in contrast, by the deliberation on values and by a choice which 
stems from the hesitation that leads to a decision. As Perelman observes, we do not 
exert our freedom where there is neither the possibility of choice nor alternative; it is 
deliberation that distinguishes men from automata; and deliberation is in the source of 
decision. 
Apropos of this point, Danblon (2002) observes that modern societies, having 
reached a certain institutional maturity, rely more on a human trial than on a mechanical 
application of procedures for finding the truth. From this point of view, argumentation 
only takes place when a communion of ideas is possible. In this sense, the values are on 26  Bakhtiniana, São Paulo, 9 (1): 19-35, Jan./Jul. 2014. 
 
the base of any trial or assessment, which makes them very important for argumentation 
and, above all, for justice. 
Perelman emphasizes that the power granted to the judge 
 
is  not  limited  by  a  legal  range  clearly  defined  once  and  for  all  – 
because the terms of a law, clear and deprived of ambiguity in certain 
application cases, can fail in other situations (2012, p.574).
3  
 
In fact, the judge has the obligation to judge, but, in addition, he must build a 
foundation for his trial, indicating how to establish a connection between his decision 
and the legislation he applies. His argumentation must serve, therefore, to justify the 
application of the law making his decision valid, which gives argumentation a central 
place for justice, because it only becomes fair if it is valid inside the values admitted as 
such in the community where it is inserted.   
In analyzing the role of decision, Perelman (1999) observes that opinions are 
elaborated thanks to the reasonings that have nothing to do with the evidence or with the 
analytical logic, but with assumptions based on values whose analysis depends on an 
argumentation theory. From this point of view, the notion of justice excludes the notion 
of the absolute and is founded upon men’s agreement, an aspect pointed out by Amossy 
(2006) in Perelman’s proposal. According to this expert in discourse, the New Rhetoric 
postulated by Perelman offers an important framework to discourse analysis, as it insists 
on some premises such as the founding character of premises and the agreement points 
in the argumentative interaction, beyond commonplaces widely used in argumentation 
(cf. AMOSSY, 2006). 
Considering that argumentation implies reasoning, Perelman (1999) emphasizes 
that the questions related to justice and to its insertion into the field of Law, as well as 
those concerning legal reasoning, can only be answered if we really understand an idea 
of Law in a certain society, or, at least, an idea admitted tacitly by it. This thinking is 
echoed by Bakhtin when he affirms that 
 
The way in which the word conceptualizes its object is a complex act 
–  all  objects,  open  to  dispute  and  overlaid  as  they  are  with 
                                                 
3 Text in original: n’est pas limit￩ par un cadre l￩gal clairement d￩fini une fois pour toutes – car les 
termes d’une loi, clairs et d￩pourvus d’ambiguït￩ par rapport à certains cas d’application peuvent cesser 
de l’￪tre dans d’autres situations (PERELMAN, 2012, p.574).  Bakhtiniana, São Paulo, 9 (1): 19-35, Jan./Jul. 2014.  27 
 
qualifications, are from one side highlighted while from the other side 
dimmed  by  heterogeneous  social  opinion,  by  an  alien  word  about 
them.  [...]  The  way  in  which  the  word  conceives  its  object  is 
complicated  by  a  dialogic  interaction  within  the  object  between 
various aspects of its socio-verbal intelligibility (1981, p.277). 
 
We can say that Justice, which comprises formulae not always consonant, is a 
discoursive object and, as such, it is crossed by disagreement.  
 
3 Justice and Argumentation: An Ethical and Dialogical Principle 
 
We admit with Perelman (1999) that Law is elaborated through controversies, 
through  the  argumentation  showing  that  the  arguments  used  by  the  opponent  are 
irrelevant, arbitrary, innoportune, and invalid, and that the solution proposed is unfair. It 
is in the same sense that we quote Vološinov: 
 
Thus,  each  of  the  distinguishable  significative  elements  of  an 
utterance and the entire utterance as a whole entity are translated in 
our  minds  into  another,  active  and  responsive  context.  Any  true 
understanding is dialogic in nature. Understanding is to utterance as 
one line of a dialogue is to the next. Understanding strives to match 
the speaker’s word with a counter word. Only in understanding a word 
in a foreign tongue is the attempt made to match it with the “same” 
word in one’s own language. 
Therefore, there is no reason for saying that meaning belongs to a 
word as such. In essence, meaning belongs to a word in its position 
between speakers; that is, meaning is realized only in the process of 
active, responsive understanding. Meaning does not reside in the word 
or in the soul of the speaker or in the soul of the listener. Meaning is 
the effect of interaction between speaker and listener produced via the 
material of a particular sound complex (1973, p.102-103; emphasis in 
original). 
 
We  can  relate  the  Bakhtinian  thinking  to  the  controversial  aspect  of  Law. 
According to Perelman (1999, p.8), even in a specific society “the legal reasonings are 
accompanied  by  incessant  controversies,  and  this  occurs  as  much  among  the  most 
distinguished jurists as among the judges who work in the most prestigious courts.”
 4 
From this point of view, the legal reasoning could be very rarely considered right or 
                                                 
4 Text in original: les raisonnements juridiques s’accompagnent de controverses incessantes, et ceci 
aussi bien entre les juristes les plus ￩minents qu’entre les juges qui si￨gent dans les tribunaux les plus 
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wrong,  true  or  false,  in  an  impersonal  way,  because  making  a  decision  in  Law  
necessarily implies a personal commitment which has to do with the responsible ethical 
aspect postulated by Bakhtin (1981, p.346), for whom “every discourse pressupposes a 
special conception of the listener, of his apperceptive background and the degree of his 
responsiveness; it presupposes a specific distance.” 
We  can  affirm,  therefore,  that  legal  reasoning  is  a  responsible-responsive 
attitude that leads us to the conception of dialogism. In the Bakhtinian dialogic vision, 
 
In point of fact, word is a two-sided act. It is determinated equally, by 
whose word it is and for whom it is meant. As word, it is precisely the 
product of the reciprocal relationship between speaker and listener, 
addresser  and  addressee  (VOLOŠINOV,  1973,  p.86;  emphasis  in 
original). 
 
Indeed, in rare occasions good reasons presented to support a decision are not 
questioned for reasons which are also good in favor of different decisions, and two faces 
of the word emerge from this questioning. The same occurs when justice is the matter. 
There are, in these reasons, values whose appreciation varies depending on the person 
and  is  not  limited  to  a  calculation,  so  nothing  proves  that  the  decision  made  is 
effectively the only fair solution for the problem presented. We find here a convergence 
between Perelman’s and Bakhtin’s ideas.  
In  analysing  Bakhtin,  Amorim  also  associates  his  ideas  to  the  questions  of 
Justice. For this author, the concepts of validity and justice are, in Bakhtinian theory, 
“in  relation  to  the  individual  who  thinks,  from  the  positioning  which  he  thinks” 
(AMORIM, 2009, p.22).
 5 This thinking is in accordance with Perelman’s postulates, for 
whom  the  concept  of  justice  is  neither  absolute  nor  based  on  truth;  from  this 
perspective, the justice act is seen as an ethical gesture which considers the other, or in 
Bakhtin’s words (1981, p.279), “the word is born in a dialogue as a living rejoinder, 
within it; the word is shaped in dialogic interaction with an alien word that is already in 
the object. A word forms a concept of its own object in a dialogic way.” The other is 
always  present  in  action  and  in  thinking,  in  assessment  and  in  judgment,  which 
                                                 
5 Text in original: [...] em relação ao contexto do sujeito que pensa, à posição a partir da qual ele pensa. 
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emphasizes the dialogic aspect of justice, and of the judging act. Legal reasoning, as 
Perelman characterizes it, points out this dialogic aspect: 
 
[...]  the  legal  reasoning  aims  to  discern  and  justify  the  authorized 
solution  of  a  controversy,  in  which  argumentations  in  various 
meanings, conducted in accordance with imposed procedures, attempt 
to  enforce  in  different  situations  a  value  or  a  commitment  among 
values,  which  can  be  accepted  in  a  certain  environment  and  at  a 
certain moment (PERELMAN, 1999, p.183).
 6 
 
It is worth remembering that every discourse aims at an interlocutor who also 
constitutes it, a concept that, according to Amossy (2005), is in the core of the concept 
of  audience,  which  is  very  important  for  the  Rhetoric  defined  by  Perelman  in  his 
Tratado  da  Argumentação,  developed  with  Olbrechts-Tyteca,  as  a  speaker’s 
construction, not of the effective, real audience. According to the author, this conception 
of dialogism is the most pertinent to the analysis of the argumentative discourse because 
the person who argues  builds  an image of the  other, of his beliefs,  knowledge and 
opinions, and, based on this image, he builds his discourse to the interlocutor, predicting 
reactions and possible objections. It is in this sense that, according to the author, the 
positioning of the discourse toward the other, as Bakhtin insists, meets with the basic 
principle which is the foundation of Rethoric since Aristotle’s days until Perelman in 
modern times. 
The  convergence  between  the  concept  of  dialogism  and  the  foundations  of 
Rhetoric allows us, in accordance with Bakhtin, to understand how something repetitive 
and formal in the language also becomes formal meanings which are renewed in the act 
of enunciation. This implies taking into account the matter of personal freedom – and 
we  can  include  the  law  interpretation  by  the  judge  as  one  of  the  instances  of  this 
freedom according to the pertinent values to the society in which he is in.   
Meaning  in  general  and  the  law  interpretation  by  the  judge  are  collective 
products  of  a  cultural  system  which  is  legitimized  by  the  communal  acceptance. 
Specifically in the legal field, the laws, in this sense, crystallize the collective values, 
but they don’t contain the meanings applicable to any cases. On the other hand, these 
                                                 
6 Text in original: [...] le raisonnement judiciaire vise à dégager et à justifier la solution autoris￩e d’une 
controverse, dans laquelle des argumentations en sens divers, menées conformément à des procédures 
imposées,  cherchent  à  faire  valoir,  dans  des  situations  variées,  une  valeur  ou  en  compromis  entre 
valeurs, qui puisse être accepté dans un milieu et un moment donnés (PERELMAN, 1999, p.136).  30  Bakhtiniana, São Paulo, 9 (1): 19-35, Jan./Jul. 2014. 
 
meanings are not in the person, the judge, who takes them to legitimize his decisions. 
This reflection leads us to Bakhtin: 
 
The  speaking  person  and  his  discourse,  as  subject  of  thought  and 
speech,  is,  of  course,  treated  in  the  ethical  and  legal  realms  only 
insofar as it contributes to the specific interests of these disciplines. 
All  methods  for  transmitting,  formulating  and  framing  another’s 
discourse  are  made  subordinate  to  such  special  interests  and 
orientations (1981, p.350). 
 
A  discoursive  confrontation,  in  the  legal  sphere,  occurs  precisely  in  the 
argumentative game. It can be said that in this sphere the argumentative dialogue directs 
the construction of meaning – the law interpretation – as a product in a certain sense ad 
hoc, since it is constantly modified by the dynamic aspect of language in society, once it 
is also the result of the arguments built in the same language.  
Recently, in Brazil we have followed a case involving the trial of requests for 
reconsideration by the Federal Supreme Court (STF).
7 These appeals were presented by 
the defendants’ attorneys because of the Criminal Action 470, which was brought by the 
Public Prosecution Service, in STF, against some members of President Luís Inácio 
Lula  da  Silva’s  administration  and  of  the  Workers’  Party.  They  were  accused  of 
political corruption by means of buying votes of parliamentarians in Brazil’s National 
Congress in 2005 and 2006, in the case known as Mensalão. 
Requests for reconsideration are foreseen in the article 333 of the STF Internal 
Regiment for defendants who have obtained at least four favorable votes, giving them 
the right for a new trial. However, the same benefit was omitted in the law 8.038/1990, 
which regulates the actions in the STF. The conflict among normative guidelines led to 
an impass in the Supreme Court.  
In the discoursive confrontation between the Supreme Court Justices the dialogic 
aspect of the legal argumentation to which we referred before is evident, as well as the 
linguistic and discoursive process of the construction of meaning in which the voices 
sometimes join other voices and sometimes confront them. As an example, we propose 
the analysis of two excerpts of votes by the Supreme Court Justices who rejected or 
accepted the requests.  
                                                 
7 Supremo Tribunal Federal in Portuguese. In the text, we will refer to Brazil’s Federal Supreme Court 
using the abbreviation STF. Bakhtiniana, São Paulo, 9 (1): 19-35, Jan./Jul. 2014.  31 
 
Supreme  Court  Justice  Joaquim  Barbosa  manifested  his  opposition  to  the 
requests for reconsideration on the basis of the omission of the law regarding these 
requests. This enunciator is supported by the voice of public opinion, reinforced by 
most of the mass media and by common sense which accuse Brazilian justice of being 
lenient  with  white-collar  criminals,  as  in  the  case  of  the  defendants  in  question. 
Barbosa’s discourse, as we can observe in the following excerpt, reflects this voice: 
 
The  review  of  facts  and  evidences  by  the  same  judging  body  is 
absolutely  improper. The Constitution  and  the  laws  do  not  foresee 
additional  privileges.  This  Court  has  already  taken  five  months  in 
2012 and now in the second semester of 2013 we have already spent 
more  than  a  month  deliberating.  The  acceptance  of  requests  for 
reconsideration in this case would be a way of making the deed eternal 
(http://www.olhardireto.com.br/noticias. Access in: Oct 17, 2013).
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Being  aware  of  the  legislative  ommision,  since  by  the  letter  of  the  law  the 
defendants  would  have  the  right  to  trial  reconsideration,  the  Supreme  Court Justice 
chooses a discourse which does not relativize the situation and makes appeal to the rule 
of justice, according to which all human beings must be treated equally, that is, “to each 
the same thing.” Thus, part of the value judgment which establishes that it is preferable 
and desirable to close the case so that a problem is not extended and, supported by the 
society discourse that sees the justice as an institution which discriminates the poor, he 
refutes the aristocratic conception “to each according to his ranks.” At the beginning of 
the excerpt, he does not mention the review of the trial, which would be the review of 
something subjective, but  he refers to  the “facts  and evidences,”  i.e.,  the objective, 
concrete elements. By saying that this review is “absolutely improper” and that “the 
Constitution and the laws do not foresee additional privileges,” he erases the existence of 
the STF’s article 333 and resorts to the supreme law, which is available to all citizens 
and not only to those who can appeal to the Supreme Court.  
To stress his position linguistically and to emphasize the longevity of the case as 
something  harmful  to  society,  he  uses  the  adjective  locution  “absolutely  improper,” 
whose  purpose  is  to  supply  by  means  of  the  universality  of  the  proposition  the 
                                                 
8 Text in original: A reapreciação de fatos e provas pelo mesmo órgão julgador é de toda indevida. A 
Constituição e as leis não preveem privilégios adicionais. Esta Corte já se debruçou cinco meses em 
2012 e agora no segundo semestre de 2013 já ultrapassamos um mês de deliberação. Admitir embargos 
infringentes no caso seria uma forma de eternizar o feito. 32  Bakhtiniana, São Paulo, 9 (1): 19-35, Jan./Jul. 2014. 
 
exceptional nature of the request. In addition, he uses the adverb of time “already” twice 
in the sense of “before, previously,” associating these two occurences of the adverb to 
the past tense, indicating a finished action: “This Court has already taken” and “we have 
already spent more than a month deliberating.” Thus he reinforces the collective voice 
which clamors for the fast closure of the case as well as the discourse denouncing the 
slowness of justice and the privileges that it grants to powerful people.  
When he refers to the alternative of accepting the requests that he refutes, he 
uses the verb in the conditional tense “to admit [...] would be,” which indicates a fact 
that depends on a condition. In this case, this virtual condition would be “making the 
deed eternal,” that is, the Supreme Court would agree with the game of the attorneys’ 
defendants  in  order  to  postpone  the  case  and,  therefore,  it  would  be  against  the 
collective voice claiming for a swift and fair justice in accordance with the Constitution.  
Supreme Court Justice Luís Roberto Barroso, in the opposing camp, was based 
on the requests of reconsideration foreseen. Because he defends the acceptance of the 
requests, his discourse is more conciliatory; it confronts divergent points of view and 
articulates  them,  appealing  to  the  value  based  on  the  place  of  order,  on  what  is 
established by law, that is, “to each according to his legal entitlement.” According to 
this, “the rule of the game” should not be changed, even if it seems unfair: 
 
Even  if  it  is  possible  to  suppress the requests  for reconsideration,  I  think  a 
change in the rule of the game would be inappropriate when it is almost in the 
end. There is no reason to subject such an emblematic process to a casuistic 
decision at the last minute. As the whole Brazilian society, I am also exhausted 
by this case. It must end. We have to turn the page [...]. Nobody wants the 
extention of this lawsuit. However, the Constitution exists precisely for this: To 
prevent the right of 11 people from being disregarded due to the interest of 
millions. (http://www.olhardireto.com.br/noticias. . Access in: Oct 17, 2013).
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The excerpt of the Supreme Court Justice’s discourse begins with the term “even 
if,” whose function is to embody the opposing voice to refute it. With that, he does not 
simply oppose the other’s voice, but he immerses in it, then from there he presents 
                                                 
9 Text in original: Mesmo que se queira cogitar da supressão dos infringentes, penso que seria imprópria 
uma mudança da regra do jogo quando ele se encontra quase no final. Não há porque sujeitar um 
processo  tão  emblemático  a  uma  decisão  casuística,  de  última  hora.  A  exemplo  de  toda  sociedade 
brasileira, eu também estou exausto deste processo. Ele precisa chegar ao fim. Temos que virar esta 
página. [...] Ninguém deseja o prolongamento desta ação. Mas é para isso que existe a Constituição: 
para  que  o  direito  de  11  não  seja  atropelado  pelo  interesse  de  milhões. 
(http://www.olhardireto.com.br/noticias. Acesso em: 17 out. 2013) Bakhtiniana, São Paulo, 9 (1): 19-35, Jan./Jul. 2014.  33 
 
himself as a dissonant voice: “As the whole Brazilian society” “I am also exhausted” 
“We need to turn the page.” 
The verb “think” gives the whole discourse a rational tone which is amplified 
when he evokes the “rule of the game,” as well as the same “Constitution” which had 
been used in Barbosa’s discourse, appealing to the values founded upon tradition. By 
placing eleven people against millions, Barroso reverses his opponent’s equation: It is 
not  eleven privileged people who  make the  request,  but  a small  group  whose right 
should not be “disregarded due to the interests of millions” and fights the mass. In this 
sense,  the  adversative  conjunction  opening  the  last  sentence  highlights  the  contrast 
between what it is said, “I join the chorus of those who want to close this case,” and 
what  it  will  be  said,  “I  disagree  with  those  who  want  to  end  this  case.”  This  last 
proposition gains more prestige because the Law is above the interest of groups, even if 
this is about the interests of a majority; the Law is the supreme value. It is curious here 
how Barroso’s discourse appropriates, now with a totally different intention, the same 
conception which guided Barbosa’s discourse: “to each the same thing.” 
 
Final Considerations 
 
Without considering the merit of the specific case of Mensalão, in regard to the 
matter  of  Justice  approached  in  this  text,  it  is  based  on  a  principle  essentially 
argumentative and dialogic in its double dimension: Whether it is understood as a shift 
between  subjects  who express  divergent  ideas  or understood as  sonant  or dissonant 
voices which are evoked in the speech of each subject. This dialogism permeates the 
concept of Justice, as much from the point of view considered fair, as from the point of 
view of the legal acts that strive to build justice argumentatively in favor of a particular 
case.  
In  addition,  the  idea  of  dialogism  inherent  to  the  interactive  aspect  of  the 
language is echoed in Perelman’s postulates, particularly in those related to the act of 
judging connected to the judge. Both Perelman and Bakhtin are inserted into a world 
where  monolithic  truths  have  vanished.  Thus,  recognizing  and  understanding  the 
heterogeneous, contradictory, dialogic aspect that permeates one of the most elaborated 
human institutions, the legal sphere, is recognizing the uniqueness of discourse and the 34  Bakhtiniana, São Paulo, 9 (1): 19-35, Jan./Jul. 2014. 
 
multiple possibilities that it offers so that we can have access to the way the concept of 
Justice is constructed.  
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